



## SALAFI, HADITH, AND ISLAMIC LAW: IDENTITY POLITICS AND WAHABI MOVEMENT IN EAST KALIMANTAN

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**Abstrak:** Kajian ini bertujuan untuk membahas tipologi pemahaman hadis kelompok Salafi-Wahabi dan implikasinya pada hukum Islam. Studi ini merupakan penelitian kualitatif dengan menggunakan teori politik identitas dan teori pemahaman hadis. Politik identitas digunakan untuk menganalisis Salafi sebagai sebuah gerakan, sedangkan teori pemahaman hadis menganalisis varian pemahaman hadisnya. Artikel ini menyimpulkan bahwa kelompok Salafi berkembang akibat reaksi mereka terhadap perilaku bid'ah, sinkretisme, pluralisme, liberalisme dan pengaruh Syiah. Bagi mereka, organisasi Islam yang mainstream di Indonesia gagal merespons bahkan ikut larut oleh arus tersebut sehingga umat Islam semakin jauh dari hadis. Politik identitas mereka diartikulasikan dengan berbagai proyek, yaitu kembali kepada al-Quran dan sunnah, pakaian gamis, jenggot dan penggunaan kuniyah. Hal ini merupakan cara untuk melegitimasi eksistensi mereka guna meresistensi identitas mainstream. Penelitian ini beragumen bahwa pemahaman hadis kelompok Salafi yang tekstual melahirkan hukum Islam yang kaku dan mengakibatkan konflik sosial. Karena itu, pemerintah dan organisasi keagamaan hendaknya mengembangkan Islam washatiyah sebagai kontra ideologi dan wacana.

**Kata kunci:** metode pemahaman hadis; Salafi-Wahabi; politik identitas; hukum Islam

**Abstract:** This study explores the Salafi-Wahhabi movement's typology of hadith understanding and its consequences for Islamic law. This qualitative study employs the identity politics theory and the hadith understanding theory. Identity politics is utilized to assess the Salafi movement, and the concept of hadith understanding is used to examine different understandings of hadith. This study found that Salafi developed as a response to the behavior of *bid'ah* (innovation in religion), currents of syncretism, pluralism, liberalism, and the legitimating influence of Shia. The Salafi believes that Islamic organizations in Indonesia have failed to respond and have even been dissolved by the current situation, leading Muslims to stray away from hadith. Their identity politics is defined through numerous projects, including returning to Quran and sunnah slogans, putting on robes (long garments for both men and women), beards, and kuniyah. This is a way for them to justify their existence to oppose conventional identities. This study contends that the Salafi group's textual understanding of hadith promotes rigid Islamic law, which leads to societal conflict. As a result, the government and religious institutions should work together to develop Washatiyah Islam as a counter-ideology and discourse.

**Keywords:** method of understanding hadith; Salafi-Wahabi; identity politics; Islamic law

## Introduction

Salafi (or Salafi-Wahhabi) is a new Islamic group movement that emerged in Indonesia in the mid-1980s and has since grown through seizing public space and strengthening democracy. Initially, this organization posed itself as a defender of Islamic political interests. One of the movements is the discourse on establishing an Islamic State, or the imposition of Islamic rule in Indonesia, so that it is better, as stated in the Jakarta Charter. This gave rise to identity politics in Indonesia, which are based on political ideologies such as Islamism and nationalism (Aji & Yunus, 2019; Ridho Al-Hamdi, 2015; Salim GP, 2017).

Hasan argues that when several segments of Indonesian society experience an identity crisis, Salafi seeks grounds to justify their activity. The Salafi community teaches an alternative understanding of Islam focused on formalizing several Islamic expressions and demands for social and political issues through their community associations known as *halaqah*. The Islamic community's need for alternate methods appears to grow with globalization. Salafi groups are active in all aspects of their activity, but many people who follow their religious path are unaware that they are the target of their da'wah endeavors. Their activities follow "friends inviting friends, families inviting families, and neighbors inviting neighbors." (Hasan, 2012, p. 114).

The encouragement to return to essential identity is a critical milestone in Indonesia's Salafi movement. They typically maintain a "morality wall," which refers to behavioral beliefs distinct from the others. The wall transforms into a secure and free barrier and separation. They then portray the community outside the walls as being harmed, dirty, polluted, contagious, and hazardous, conflicting with the community inside the wall. Within the "wall," they actualize a severe, rigid, and exclusive lifestyle. This is apparent from the way they position themselves in the surrounding community. They believe that the holy Islamic civilization must be restored from the evils of the Westernized world for the glory of Islam. This can be seen in distinct behavioral pat, communication, clothing, and social relationship patterns (Hasan, 2012).

The Hadith or Sunnah is one of the exciting aspects of their calls and movements to reinforce this identity. They refer to the hadith in a doctrinal method of understanding to their congregations in all areas

relating to the exclusive and different behavior discussed above. They recognize that to restore Islam's glory as it was achieved in ancient times, people's lifestyles must return to the pattern of life represented by the Prophet. The Prophet's pattern of life has been described in his hadiths. As a result, individuals must return to the Prophet's hadith or Sunnah. Hadith plays a crucial role in reinforcing their identity. Several hadiths that some may regard as “not principle” are viewed as highly important for the Salafi community to establish their identity.

The Salafi community's teachings are spreading rapidly throughout Indonesia. East Kalimantan is one of these areas. Although less widespread than in other areas such as Sulawesi, Salafi teachings are expanding significantly in East Kalimantan, an industrial and mining region. Multiple companies have expanded and prospered, and as a result, a significant number of workers from outside East Kalimantan have been recruited. The employees' personalities tend to think practically and unquestionably compatible with the Salafi thinking style. In addition to employees, Salafi concepts have expanded to public universities. They target students from public schools that do not have an Islamic foundation, particularly *ushul fiqh*. These types of students are usually much more accessible to recruit than students from Islamic boarding schools.

A strict, uncompromising, exclusive, and intolerant lifestyle characterizes the Salafi understanding of Islamic teachings. Genealogy of textual understanding can be traced back to Ibn Taymiyah, a scholar who criticized numerous Islamic scholars regarded as incongruous with Salaf Islam. Ibn Taymiyah applied *mantiq*, *qiyas*, *tasawuf*, and *tarekat*, while this knowledge is required to interpret the Quran and Hadith passages. For example, if *qiyas* and *mantiq* are not used to understand the fundamental concept, one's understanding of Islamic law will inevitably become textual (el Fadl, 2005; Panovski, 2011: 16–26). In this context, the Ibn Taymiyah movement was known as a group that carried the Islamic purification movement with the jargon of “returning to the Qur'an and Sunnah,” which was later continued by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab.”

Furthermore, scholars such as Nashiruddin al-Albani (1914-1999) in modern times emerged standardized textual knowledge of hadith without any essential interpretation (Rahim et al., 2022). Albani, like Ibnu Taymiyah, inherited the characteristics of a critical scholar and

did not hesitate to accuse people who disagreed with his understanding, known as takfiri (Amin, 2004; Hasyim, 2017; Wagemakers, 2019), as well as criticized followers of particular schools of thought (Durguti, 2022). Albani courageously challenged the mutawatir hadith on various occasions, even though Bukhari and Muslim narrated it once, there were inconsistencies in several of his writings (Andi & Ardiansyah, 2017; Dermawan, 2013; Rahim et al., 2022). Most hadith scholars believe that the truth of mutawatir hadith is unquestionable, primarily if Bukhari and Muslim narrated it. This background causes the Salafi group to be very textual and rigid in understanding the Qur'an, hadith, and Islamic law.

According to existing research, the Salafi movement in Indonesia emerged by displaying their identity in appearance with long beards, robes, turbans, and ankle-length trousers. Their women are veiled in black. This campaign began in 1990 by occupying open preaching areas on campuses, in the suburbs, and communities (Hasan, 2007: 83; Noviantari & Safri, 2022). Following the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, this movement evolved into an Islamic political movement with the emergence of paramilitary groups, including Laskar Pembela Islam (LPI), Laskar Jihad (LJ), and Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia (LMI) (Hasan, 2008). Their identity increasingly exists in the public space with the emergence of Salafi religious teachers, who usurps the established religious authority from the kyai (Wahid, 2012). Salafis also employ media propaganda by broadcasting their social-religious identity on the radio (Masduki et al., 2022). Salafi has a textual understanding of the Quran and Hadith and uses politics to influence social-religious movements, particularly in Indonesia.

This paper differs from the previous studies in that no one has mainly studied the Salafi movement in East Kalimantan. Nonetheless, some of the initial studies will become state-of-the-art and will supplement the analyses in the study. Therefore, examining the phenomenon of Salafi Islam in East Kalimantan, which is intertwined with local political identity, is a unique phenomenon to study. This article demonstrates their inflexibility in understanding legal hadiths by examining several sample cases regarding their conduct, even though the interpretations of these hadiths might have been produced and understood dynamically alongside societal social dynamics. Furthermore, their behavior is examined to

determine the understanding of textuality that construct is essentially a method for constructing a new identity by undermining the previous identity that is based on the established contextual knowledge.

## **Method**

This research is a qualitative research using the theory of identity politics and understanding of hadith (Castells, 2010; Ismail, 1994; Nordholt, 2018). The theory of identity politics studies movements that prioritize group interests in the name of religion or non-religious in challenging mainstream groups (Castells, 2010; Nasrudin, 2018; Nordholt, 2018). Meanwhile, the science of *ma'an al-hadith*, which investigates the Salafi group's different understanding of hadith, is also known as the theory of understanding hadith. There are two types of understandings of hadith, textual and contextual, such that hadith can have universal, temporal, and local meanings. This textual understanding of hadith has implications for Islamic law in the Salafi group's daily practices (Ismail, 1994; Yakub, 1995). Thus, textual comprehension of hadith influences identity politics, which gives rise to the strict and exclusive character of Islamic law.

Observation; in-depth interviews and documentation were used to obtain field data. Observations were conducted in three stages: the first focused on the Islamic boarding school and its surroundings, the second on the learning process, worship, and patterns of interaction with fellow students and the community, and the third on cross-checking the results of interviews and documentation. Interviews were conducted with representatives of the Islamic boarding school's leadership, teaching staff, particularly hadith teaching staff, students, and the community surrounding the Islamic boarding school. Field data were obtained in three locations in East Kalimantan: Samarinda, Balikpapan, and Kutai Kertanegara. East Kalimantan is regarded as the most significant industrial sector on the island of Borneo, having a vibrant social and religious pattern. These three areas were chosen because they were the most important in developing the Salafi community.

## **Identity Politics**

Several research findings indicate that regarding identity politics, at least two concepts are employed differently in political science, notably

political identity and identity politics. Political identity is a construct that establishes a subject's position and interests within a specific political society. Meanwhile, identity politics is a political process for organizing specific identities as a source and means of political power. Manuel Castells proposes three stages of identity politics: first, legitimizing identity, which is a specific identity embedded or manufactured by a dominant society against inferior groups to differentiate and exhibit lesser status than the dominant group. Second, there is resistance identity, which means that there is resistance to the inferior group that was previously constructed; they fight back by reconstructing the meaning of the identity that the dominant group pinned on; there is re-reading and new meaning of the old identity that is built, from pejorative meanings to positive meanings. Third, project identity, where political initiatives from inferior groups use reconstructed identities to attain certain positions for economic balance and equal rights in education and other spheres of life (Castells, 2010; Syamsurijal & Halim, 2019: vi–viii).

According to Sri Astuti Buchari, identity politics is a tool for an ethnic (particular group) to struggle to achieve a specific goal. Its emergence is more due to certain factors that ethnic (a group) see as the existence of pressure or political injustice they feel (Buchari & Bainus, 2014: 20–21). Iden According to Donald L Morowitz, identity politics is a solid line determining who is accepted and who acts. The determination lines cannot be modified so that the status of member or non-member appears to be permanent. Agnes Heller opines that identity politics is a political movement emphasizing diversity as a significant political term (Haboddin, 2012: 119–120). Cressida Heyes defines identity politics as a sign of political involvement (Nasrudin, 2018: 36). The preceding explanation is pertinent to Sri Astuti Buchari's statement that difference is an essential aspect in comprehending the existence of identity politics, which is reinforced by Setyanto's statement that identity politics is “the politics of difference.” The struggle for identity politics is the struggle of marginalized groups or individuals, whether through politics, social, economic, or cultural means.

In the Indonesian setting, identity politics became more prominent during the 2018 DKI Jakarta regional election, and this pattern continued with the 2019 Presidential Election. Certain groups constructed their choices for legislative and executive members using religious jargon.

In this case, the 212 Action was also said to represent the defense of Islam. Although later this confrontation ended with the merging of the two groups in the government (DS & Sutiadi, 2020; Hanan, 2020; Nasrudin, 2018; Zainuddin et al., 2022)

### **Salafi and Its Penetration into East Kalimantan**

As a movement, Salafi was founded in the 7<sup>th</sup> H century by Hanbaliyah scholars who believed that their ideas and movements were representations of Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal's thoughts (Nashir, 2013: 151). Ibn Taimiyah, a scholar born in Haran in 1263, rose to prominence through harsh criticisms of his opponents, particularly his antipathy for philosophers, theologians, and Sufism, which he saw as deviating from the purity of Islamic teachings. His well-known slogan was "Returning to the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet" (Haque, 1996: 797). The next movement was led by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab (1703-1787). Its inception was to counteract tariqat ideas considered shirk and contradicting Qur'an and hadith. Abdul Wahhab's ideas significantly impacted the development of nineteenth-century reform, such as Egyptian scholar Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1838-1887). This was where the Wahhabiyah movement emerged (Hasyim, 2017).

Contemporary Salafi can be categorized into two factions based on their strategy. First, some respect democracy and support the Constitution. Islamist political groups influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt in 1928 are included in this category. In Indonesia, this movement is represented by the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Literally, Prosperous Justice Party or PKS) (Al-Makassary & Gaus A.F., 2010: 13). The second category is political organizations that openly oppose democratic and constitutional government systems and promote alternative, more Islamic governing systems. This category includes Hizbut Tahrir (HT), founded in Palestine in 1953. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) was an Indonesian organization that was particularly active in response to national and global political issues. HTI believed this revolutionary strategy could be a viable means to defend Sharia in general and address the difficulties and challenges that Muslims face in the present era (Rahmat, 2005: 148).

Salafi Islam first appeared in Indonesia in 1980, establishing the Arabic Language Teaching Institute (LPBA) in Jakarta and afterward



renamed LIPIA (Institute for Islamic Studies and Arabic Literature). Sheikh Abdul Aziz Abdullah al-Ammar, a student of Sheikh Abdullah bin Baz, a prominent Salafi figure at the time, came to Jakarta and discussed with Muhammad Natsir, requesting his participation in the institution. Through scholarships, LIPIA then assisted students from various Islamic boarding schools in continuing their education in the Middle East. They met Salafi experts such as Yemen's Sheikh Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadhi and Jordan's Sheikh Muhammad Nashiruddin al-Bani (Hamid, 2014: 3). These alumni from the Middle East spread throughout Indonesia, including East Kalimantan.

The existence of Salafi da'wah in East Kalimantan was marked by the establishment of the Ibnul Qoyyim Islamic Boarding School in Balikpapan, which was cared for by Ustadz Askari, a migrant from Makassar City and previously a Tadrib ad-Duat alumni at the Ihyaus Sunnah Degolan Islamic Boarding School, Yogyakarta, assisted by Ustadz Ja'far Umar Thalib (Hamid, 2014). This indicates that this Salafi da'wah was a variant and network of Ja'far Umar Talib, which was non-haraki non-hizbi Salafi Yamani, who was not part of an organization and was not involved in responding to developing political issues. They even declared abstention in the presidential and legislative elections, claiming that voting was a right rather than an obligation. "We have the right to vote or not," they said. However, in the end, Ibn al-Qoyyim's group declared its independence from Jakfar Umar Talib's network. They considered him to have deviated from the Sunnah by actively participating in government demonstrations. They stated that Ahlussunnah does not allow criticism of the government publicly because it is considered an act of humiliation of the government before its people. They also condemned the political movement led by Ustadz Zaytun Rasmin, the Founder and Leader of the Wahdah Islamiyah institution. They opposed preaching through television broadcasts because this act is considered to have violated the Sunnah, and it was also prohibited by the Prophet through the hadith prohibiting taking pictures (al-Bugisi, 2019).

Aside from Ibnul Qoyyim, Pesantren Imam Syafii in the Samarinda-Balikpapan axis, focusing on Tahfidz Quran is another educational institution founded by the Salafi network. The name Imam Syafii was chosen because Imam Syafii is a "bone of contention" for Muslims, and the majority of East Kalimantan people follow the Imam Shafii school

of thought, even though their worship is similar to that of the Hanbali school. The teachers at this school are graduates of Salafi schools in other areas, including Pesantren Imam al-Bukhari, Pesantren Abdullah bin Baz, and Pesantren Umar bin Khattab in Riau (Afrizal, 2019). This pesantren develops their students' da'wah skills (tadrib ad-Duat), hoping they will carry out da'wah movements after graduating from this institution. The students must also memorize one hundred general traditions, unique traditions told by Abu Hurairah, and five hundred selected traditions. This Salafi is a part of the TV Rodja network.

Wahdah Islamiyah also established a pesantren in Palaran, Samarinda, named Imam Syafii. This community contends that most East Kalimantan Muslims adhere to the Syafiiyah school of thought and that many Syafiiyah scholars' beliefs are followed. In addition to building Islamic boarding schools, the Wahdah Islamiyah network also built a mosque in the heart of the Samarinda community settlement. This network is more manageable because it is structured from the central, provincial, and regency or city levels. The Wahdah Islamiyah network also has representatives in all cities and regencies throughout East Kalimantan.

### **Islam in East Kalimantan before the Salafi**

Islam of the archipelago is the Islamic style of the people of East Kalimantan. This pattern adheres to an open and acculturative Islamic paradigm with local treasures that distinguish between Islamic substance and Arabic culture that may be attached to religious texts. Islam first arrived in East Kalimantan in the 16<sup>th</sup> century AD. At the time, the East Kalimantan region was still divided into kingdoms. Two opinions regarding the kingdom that was the first to embrace Islam exist. According to the first opinion, the Bulungan Kingdom (now located in Pasir Regency) was the first to embrace Islam in 1555 AD, which was brought by Datuk Mancung, an ulama descendant of King Brunei Darussalam (Majid et al., 2006, p. 46). The second thought holds that Islam arrived in East Kalimantan during the Kutai Kartanegara kingdom (now Kutai Ketanegara regency). It is claimed that from 1565 to 1605 AD, the Crown of King Kutai Kertanegara peacefully embraced Islam through Muballigh Sheikh Abdul Jawad Khatib Bungsu (known in Makassar as Dato' Ri Tiro and in Kutai, he is known as

Tunggang Parangan) and Abdul Makmur, who was known as Abdul Khatib Tunggal or Dato Ri Bandang. These two Minangkabau ulama converted the King of the Crown after successfully converting the Kings of Gowa and Tallo in the same year (Majid et al., 2006, pp. 14–16). The ulama who brought Islam to East Kalimantan through Brunei and Gowa-Tallo were Sufi. Their understanding of Islam was open and accepting of the culture that grew and developed in the community. At the same time, they had a filter to determine which cultures could be integrated with Islamic values. As a result, Islam was rapidly developing alongside the development of Kutai Kertanegara culture.

East Kalimantan has since developed into an industrial zone. Several mining companies have opened, including gas, coal, palm oil, cement, fertilizer, etc. With its ports and airports, Samarinda serves as a gateway for migrants from Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, Java, and Sumatra to move to East Kalimantan. Ultimately, large-scale population migration from other areas occurred from Banjarmasin, Sulawesi, and Java. This added to the richness of the Islamic identity emerging in East Kalimantan. For example, in the field of fiqh emerged the tradition of qunut, shared wirid after congregational prayers in a high voice, joint prayer led by the Imam and confirmed by the congregation, and shaking hands while interspersed with reading shalawat. During Ramadan, they prayed the *taraweh* of twenty rakaats, followed by shalawat and prayers for each salaam. In addition to fiqh, the teachings of Sufism and tareqat are developing in East Kalimantan, under the auspices of NU as one of the largest mass organizations in East Kalimantan and even in Indonesia, through the JATMAN (Jam'iyah tariqah al-mu'tabarah an-Nahdhiyah) institution, which oversees the muktabar tareqat institutions in the NU community.

In the socioreligious field, East Kalimantan Muslims are accommodating and dialectical to local and foreign cultures as long as they do not contradict Islamic values. This impacts the development of local wisdom, as evidenced by the recitation of *Barzanji* during the celebration. This event is customarily performed by Sulawesi migrant communities before the wedding day, commemorating the Prophet's Birthday, aqiqah, establishment and relocation to a new house, praying for a new vehicle, and so on. They argued that *Barzanji* is a book divided into several parts that tell the story of the Prophet's life, including

his characteristics. Each section is always interspersed with shalawat or prayer, for Allah always pours His mercy and salvation on the Prophet. The recitation of *Barzanji* is part of the effort of tawassul to the Prophet for Allah to bestow mercy and safety on the family of the event's owner, as promised in the hadith that Allah and his angels will repay the shalawat to the Prophet more than the prayers of the readers.

There are *dibaan* and *habsyan* events among the Banjar people of East Kalimantan, which involve reading praise to the Prophet Muhammad. The purpose and time of its implementation are identical to those of the recitation of *Barzanji* to the people of Sulawesi. *Yasinan* and *Tahlilan* events are held during the joint prayer for the family of the recently deceased on the third, seventh, fortieth, hundredth, and *haulan* days (every year). They perform this activity to pray for the recently deceased family and to send the deceased rewards (*ihdā al-thawāb*) for all Quran readings, *tahlil*, *taṣbīh*, *ṣalawāt* and *ṣadaqah* (alms) of food served. This tradition is based on the hadith of the command to read Surah Yasin for the dead, which includes the hadith about the reward to the deceased for the sadaqah performed by his family. The seven-month pregnancy ritual involves inviting neighbors to pray for the pregnant woman's safe delivery and the child's safety. Such occasions are accompanied by communal eating, intended as alms as a *tawassul* to Allah. After Eid Al-Fitr, *halal bi-halal* events to strengthen ties between members of the community are held regularly, as are commemorations of Islamic holidays such as Maulid Nabi, Isra Mikraj, and Nuzulul Qur'an (Abdullah, 2020).

Similarly, the models used in dressing are diverse. Religious leaders frequently wear *koko* clothes and turbans, and they do not oblige people to grow their beards (except for those with the potential for thick beards), and many of them pray in *sarongs* or regular-length pants. Conversely, the general public worships in long pants, shirts, *koko* or *batik*, and *sarongs*. According to them, the Sunnah of clothing covers nakedness (*aurah*); the model may vary depending on the local model as long as it serves its purpose. Ulama wear robes, turbans, and even *imāmah* to symbolize their role as ulama. Ordinary Muslim communities or non-religious experts do not wear turbans. Sarong and pants are sometimes worn, and they cover the ankles. According to them, the hadith prohibiting *isbāl* is directed at those who do it

arrogantly (Abdullah, 2020). The women wear headscarves without a niqab, some are veiled, and some have their heads uncovered. Siti Hasanah said that the scholars explained that the facial veil (*niqāb*) is not obligated for Muslim women; the proof is that it must be put off during prayer and tawaf. However, that does not mean Muslim women may not use it; sometimes, the law may even be recommended (Hasanah, 2020).

### **Salafi Perception of Islam in East Kalimantan**

As in other places, the Salafi community entered East Kalimantan with a strong sense of da'wah because Indonesian Muslims, in general, according to them, were far from faithful to Islam. NU and Muhammadiyah, two prominent organizations, could not protect the people from the sect's influence that brought Muslims away from Quran and Sunnah. Abu Nabil, one of the Salafi activists, argued that some “poisons” for Muslims in Islamic society must be removed, which became the driving force for the Salafi movement. The first is the development of superstition in society. Before the arrival of Islam in East Kalimantan, the community practiced Hinduism, the Kaharingan religion of the Dayak tribe, and animist beliefs. People in East Kalimantan who have embraced Islam and were born to Muslim parents frequently engage in superstitious behaviors based on their ancestors' customs and argue that those customs should not be abandoned. These practices include, for example, throwing offerings into the sea or river under the guise of respecting the guards because if they are not carried out, the sea and river guards may become enraged, and it is dangerous to the safety of the surrounding community. Furthermore, even though it is filled with reading verses from the Quran, the practice of burning incense at the prayer of salvation and commemorating the third, seventh, and fortieth days of a family death is an animist heritage. It is not the recitation of the Quran that we highlight but the “building” of the tradition (Abdullah, 2020).

The second poison is *bid'ah*. Bid'ah, from the perspective of the Salafi community, is something that was not done during the Prophet's time. In addition to superstition, the Salafi community focuses on the religious behavior of the community, which they believe the Prophet never taught. They considered qunut a part of bid'ah and forbade

their congregation from following it even if the Imam (leader of the prayer) was reciting it. This attitude toward qunut is also debated among Salafis; some still recite qunut while others do not. Those who read qunut usually refer to the view of Imam Ahmad Hanbal, who advocated qunut when the *imām* is reciting qunut. Similarly, *wird*, prayer, and handshake followed by shalawat are regarded as *bid'ah*. They also consider the teachings the Sufism and *tareqat* as part of the *zindiq* that must be abandoned. Other traditions that should be eliminated from society include the recitation of *Barzanji* and the observance of Islamic holidays since those traditions are viewed as *bid'ah* that should be avoided.

The third issue is liberalism. One of the NU activists once established JIL (Liberal et al.), which became a mover for liberal thinking in the Indonesian community, including people in East Kalimantan, particularly activists at universities. The Salafi community is giving serious consideration to this group. Abu Amir, for example, is concerned about this thought because it turns the Muslim generation away from their religion. They even assume that liberal religious thought does not rely on the views of Salafi scholars. Their concern is understandable, given that they interpret the JIL movement as unrestrained and out of the Islamic framework. In the context of this liberalism, they highlight the LGBT phenomenon that is becoming more prevalent in Indonesia. It is worrying that this group is expanding rapidly, and they openly fight for their legal recognition (Amir, 2019).

The fourth is pluralism and communism. Salafi in East Kalimantan considers pluralism developed in Indonesia as an act of equalizing all religions, heaven, and earth. This is concerning because, in the future, the Muslim community may practice the teachings of other religions while no longer recognizing the boundaries of Islam (Amidah, 2019). This understanding is strengthened by the Central MUI fatwa on the prohibition of pluralism developed in Indonesia. The pluralism that is being formed does not equalize all religions. This pluralism has three stages, including; first, the fact that there are a variety of religions, ethnicities, languages, skin colors, and others. Second, there is an open attitude and acceptance of the fact, and three and third, there are active efforts to promote harmony and tolerance within this plurality in order to achieve peace. In addition, they also pay attention

to the issue of communism. The problem of communism arises due to the large number of Chinese workers who enter Indonesia legally and illegally. Their concerns extend beyond the religious context to the national context, where they fear these migrants will dominate Indonesia's power and economy, as happened in Singapore, leaving residents as spectators in their own country (Amidah, 2019).

And the last concern is the spread of Shiaism. The Salafi of East Kalimantan believes Shiaism has spread covertly in their region. The Habib distributes this teaching secretly through recitations on campus and in the community where Shiaism has crept into the community or congregation without their knowledge. Shia teachings can also be found in Arabic song lyrics popular in the community but whose meaning is unknown to the majority of people, including those who sing it (Amidah, 2019).

### **The Textuality of Hadith Understanding, Identity Politics, and Its Implications in Islamic Law**

Understanding religious texts such as the Quran and hadith textually can lead to sectarianism, exclusivism, and disbelief outside one's group. This idea was sparked by the early generation's (salaf) romanticism, which was regarded as the golden age and became a reference both in *manhaj al-fikr* and in religious behavior and practice (Hasyim, 2017; Sefriyono et al., 2022). Understanding of hadith also gave birth to two typologies: first, the textualist group, which focuses on understanding the Prophet's hadith without respect for the historical process that gave birth to it. This group is primarily concerned with the text's external meaning; in this situation, the emphasis on the hadith text is solely on the language component. The second group uses contextualism. This group interprets the hadith by looking at its origins (*asbab al-wurud*) or the circumstances around the text. The first group is known as *ahl al-ra'yi*, whereas the second is known as *ahl al-hadith*. The use of these two terms grew more common during the Companions period, particularly during the rise of the *mu'tazilah* as a reaction to the *mu'tazilah* group's theological thoughts and the emergence of the *Asy'ariyah* reaction (Jakfar & Fitria, 2021; Majid et al., 2023; Nadia, 2018).

According to the textual group, if a text has multiple possible meanings, the meaning taken is explicit. This supports the idea that the

central premise must always be accurate and unequivocal. Statements that are not firm cannot be used as a central premise. Therefore, the hadith must be understood textually (in accordance with its *zahir* meaning). This is one example of a decision against Islam's multiplicity of interpretations (*al-qadā' 'alā al-ta'addudiyyāt fī al-Islām*) (Huda, 2015: 57–77). Textual understanding can influence a person's understanding and practice of religion, both extreme and moderate. The fundamental source of intolerance and radicalism is textual argumentation based on hadith. As a result, authors like Yusuf al-Qardhawi and Ali Mustafa Yakub present a more comprehensive view of hadith that includes *asbab wurud al-hadith*, *al-wahdah al-maudhu'iyah fī al-hadith*, *ikhtilaf al-ahadis*, and so on. Some individuals regard this type of hadith reasoning as a contextualization of hadith that will keep someone from developing into radicalism. This implies a connection between contextual hadith reasoning and religious radicalism. The more contextual a person understands hadith, the farther he is from radicalism (Sefriyono et al., 2022; Thohari et al., 2021).

Aside from the concerns mentioned above, the Salafi community is attempting to free society of concepts and practices that they believe are contrary to Islamic principles through four programs; returning to the al-Qur'an and Sunnah, clothing, beard, and moustache, and the use of *kunyah*. The Salafis' primary mission is to return to the Qur'an and Sunnah. They invite the Muslims of East Kalimantan to base their religious behavior on these two textual sources of Islamic teachings and abandon everything not supported by the two texts. All religious behavior, mainly worship not supported by the Quran and Sunnah, is a *bid'ah (muḥdath)* whose threat from the Prophet is severe, namely going astray and ending in hell. The central hadith they use is the one that states that anyone who makes a new religious innovation is rejected (Abu Amida). The foundation is confirmed in HR. Bukhari no. 20 and Muslim no. 1718. Furthermore, this Salafi group adheres to the Prophet's textual expression, which warns of the *bid'ah* because every *bid'ah* is punished in hell (al-Tayalisi, 2009).

They construct an understanding based on these hadiths that everything the Qur'an and Sunnah do not support is a misguided *maḥdhab*, resulting in hellfire. They ignore arguments other than the Qur'an and the Sunnah that scholars agree on, such as *ijmā'* and



*qiyās*, or those that scholars disagree on, including *maṣlaḥah mursalah*, *istiḥsān*, and so on (Afrizal, 2019) This slogan is very effective in the development of Salafi da'wah; they can recruit as many congregations as possible, particularly those with insufficient Islamic knowledge. Many people previously involved in the general Islamic tradition joined the Salafi movement. It is because the threat of *muhdats* and *bid'ah* is far more terrifying than the promised goodness of religious traditions that are not founded on Qur'anic and hadith texts. Such goodness and *faḍīlah*, according to them, can be obtained through other practices that postulate without having to practice innovations in religion.

The Islamic community of East Kalimantan's dress culture includes shirts, *batik*, *koko*, and Muslim clothing in various colors and styles. In general, they do not cover their faces. The Salafi community creates and develops a distinct identity by wearing robes or *gamis* for men. This clothing is worn during their worship and social activities. They do not wear turbans. Women dress in loose shirts or robes, extensive headscarves, and niqabs in dark colors such as black and dark blue. They claim that because the Prophet of Allah loved wearing robes, his followers should also. For them, this is based on Umm Salamah's explanation, who stated that the Prophet's favorite clothing was a robe (al-Tayalisi, 2009: no 507; al-Turmudhi, 1998, no 1685-1686).

They use *cingkrang* or cropped pants in addition to the robes, usually far above the ankles and even half of their calves. They dress very differently than most people who wear pants above the ankles. Even when they pray, they mostly use *cingkrang* and rarely wear *sarongs*, as most of the community does. They use *cingkrang* based on the Prophet's hadith about three groups Allah will not speak to on the Day of Resurrection. The Prophet's companion, Abu Zar, responded and asked who those three categories were. The Prophet said, "namely those who lengthen their clothing to cover their feet, those who like to bring up gifts, and those who sell their wares under pretenses" (al-Qusyairi, 1404 no 106). The Wahdah Islamiyah community has an appearance differs from that of the Salafi described above. They wear the same clothes as the mainstream community, such as shirts and pants that reach just above the ankles. Like most women in East Kalimantan, women are not required to wear dark clothing and a facial veil or niqab. They argue the most crucial point of clothing is its use to cover one's nakedness, whether robes or not.

The male Salafi community typically grows beards, which can be thick or as few as a few strands. They claim that the Prophet instructed his followers to grow their beards and shave their mustaches so that they would be distinguished from non-Muslims, as narrated by Ahmad and al-Nasa'i (al-Nasa'i, 2015 no 4959; Ibn Hanbal, n.d. vol. 5, no. 264).

Those hadiths indicate that Muslims are instructed to dress differently from the people of book or non-Muslims. The Prophet did not explicitly explain why we should be different from the people of the book in appearance. The Salafi group believes that looking different applies to the non-Muslim community and other Muslims who have been influenced by cultures other than the Prophet's Sunnah. Some grow their beards without grooming them, but others arrange them neatly and cut them when they grow thick enough (a handful). They shave their mustaches clean, despite the Prophet's order to shorten them to distinguish themselves from the People of the book, who lengthen them. However, it appears that they are also inconsistent in this hadith because those with white beards do not dye their beards red or yellow as the Prophet instructed.

Aside from appearance, the Salafi community develops identity through how people address them. Men with children do not use their real names, but rather *kunyah* or their child's name, preceded by the word *Abu*. This is similar to the practice of the general East Kalimantan people, who are also addressed as "Father of Nawal" because Nawal is the name of their first child, but what distinguishes it is the use of Arabic terms. The same is true for women who use *kunyah* with the name of their first child, such as *Ummi* Hamidah, because Hamidah is her first child's name. Using *kunyah* is based on the Prophet's command to his followers to use his name when naming their children (al-Bukhari, 1442, no 1977).

According to textualists, the jargon of returning the Qur'an and hadith, "sunnah" clothing, beards and mustaches, and *kunyah* is pure Islam and conforms with the Sunnah. These instances demonstrate that the Wahhabi Salafi group interprets hadiths textually without accepting contextual interpretation. This textual understanding of hadith will make religious practices rigid and inflexible because they cannot accept local and cultural values. This understanding can breed radicalism, endangering society, religion, and even the country.

The jargon of returning to the Qur'an and Sunnah is the most dangerous project as it has implications for the fields of aqeedah and Islamic law. The Salafi group argues for groups that do not conform to their version of the Quran and Sunnah; they are called heretics and even infidels. According to the Salafi people, it is lawful for their blood to be killed under certain conditions. This method of understanding becomes an ideology and even a movement practiced in an attitude of life so that it is easy to disbelieve others.

In fact, the Salafi follows an inverted logic in which they despise and consider taklid as haram, outlawing excessive clerical worship. However, they also exaggeratedly worship Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, al-Bani, and Abdullah bin Baz. As a result, Prince Mohammad bin Salman began to recognize and desired to eradicate Wahhabism as the sole ideology in Saudi Arabia at this time. Prince Salman then arrested several Wahhabi scholars and announced that the kingdom's relationship with the group was in trouble (CNN Indonesia, 2 November 2022; disway. id, 2 November 2022). Prince Salman attempted to bring Saudi Arabia towards a moderate understanding of Islam by departing from Wahhabism-Salafi, amid accusations of being a contributor to global radicalism and extremism.

Thus, there is a strong connection between hadith, Salafi philosophy, and global terrorism. Salafism regards hadith as a worldview and emphasizes the textual significance of the Prophet's hadith. When it faces political interests, this ideology gives rise to acts of global violence packaged in the discourse of global terrorism. Several scholars, including Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova, Mumtaz Ahmad, and Yoginder Sikand, have stated this viewpoint (Huda, 2015: 57).

For example, Abuya Zamzami Nas, a Wahhabi-Salafi Ustaz from Kampar, Riau, stated that the Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Jama'ah Tabligh, and Tarbiyah Islamiyah (PERTI) organizations are *firqatun dalalah* (a heretical group). The ustadz finally apologized for his statement after being pressured by the Indonesian Ulema Council in Jakarta and Riau (GoRiau.com, 25 April 2021; and Gatra.com, 25 April 2021). Similarly, Ustaz Yasir Hasan slandered the Maulid Celebration on behalf of Hadarut al-Syekh KH. Hasyim As-Asyari, claims that there is no source in Islamic law. Finally, after being forced by the public and the NU, he apologized (CNN Indonesia, 31

January 2023; Madura.tribunnews.com, 25 January 2023). These two situations have the potential to spark societal tensions and disputes. As a result, the government's proposed religious moderation to fight extremist ideologies and understandings in society should be developed and encouraged.

The textual understanding of the Wahhabi Salafi community is quite massive and has evolved into a movement. As a result, the government must deal with it actively in collaboration with the community. To combat this ideology, the government, through the Ministry of Religion, educational institutions, the National Agency for Combating Theoreticalism (BNPT), and large mass organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, as well as several other mass organizations, must collaborate and follow the exact roadmap (Dwijo et al., 2022; Nashir et al., 2019; Ni'am, 2015).

In this context, a textual view of hadith will have implications for a rigid and narrow conception of Islamic law. As a result, these groups will easily label people outside their group as infidels, as in the cases of Kampar and Madura mentioned above. If this situation persists, avoiding socioreligious disputes and societal divisions will be difficult. Then one means to combat this kind of understanding is the government's campaign through the Ministry of Religion promoting Washatiah Islam or Islamic moderation through Nahdlatul Ulama with Islam Nusantara (Faisal et al., 2022; Hanafi et al., 2022; Helmy et al., 2021). Washatiah Islam which encourages a moderate understanding of the law, can be a formula for combating radicalism that stems from a textual understanding of religious texts, resulting in a rigid and narrow understanding of Islamic law.

## Conclusion

The presence of Salafi groups in Indonesia and Kalimantan in the genealogy of thought and movement cannot be isolated from their origin in the Middle East. In its early days, classical Salafism may be traced back to the scholars Ahmad bin Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyah, who were synonymous with a textual understanding of Islamic law. Then, Salafism grew stronger during the time of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab. During this time, Salafi became a significant movement that spread to several other countries, including Indonesia and East Kalimantan. Salafi, as a

manhaj, follows the early textual generation in understanding hadith; they understand hadith as the meaning contained in the word without using contextual meaning. Salafi has particular characteristics, such as returning to the Quran and Hadith jargon, distinctive attire, and a different identity from most Muslims. From the standpoint of identity politics, this legitimizes the existence or even the projects that the Salafi movement is fighting for. A textual understanding of hadith leads to a strict, even radical, interpretation of Islamic law. This condition is dangerous since it will result in social problems and community clashes. Conversely, most Islamic organizations and societies, such as NU and Muhammadiyah, can be fostered so that Islam continues to exhibit peace and becomes a blessing for the entire community.

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